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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRIC T OF COLUMBIA CIRCUI T

ANN B. HOPKINS,
Appel lee,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE,

)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 90-7099

)
)

Appell ant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ___ )

)

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appell ant seeks no more than preser vation of the
status quo during its appeal -- mainte nance of the respec tive
positio ns of the parties that have existed through out this
litigat ion.

Appell ee respond s with the untena ble positio n that

"nothin g irrevoc able will happen on July 1, 1990 if the
judgme nt below is not stayed ."

Opposi fion ("Opp. "), at 2.

On

the contra ry, if Price Waterh ouse is forced to make appelle e a
partne r on that date, she will have the duties , respon sibilitie s, functio ns and impact of a Price Waterh ouse partne r
from that moment forward .

Virtua lly every action , reactio n and

inactio n by Ann Hopkin s as a Price Waterh ouse partne r will have
some kind of indelib le impact on the firm, its partne rs, its
staff, its clients and its reputa tion.

No subseq uent ruling by

this Court will be able to erase the history of appell ee's
tenure as a Price Waterh ouse p~rtne r.

\

There are very potent reasons, well known to the
judges of this Court, why courts of equity have for centurie s
been loathe to create and to supervis e the creation and
continu ation of persona l, professi onal or artistic
relation ships.

All those factors weigh heavily against forcing

a partner on Price Waterho use prior to the exhausti on of its
appeal.
Appelle e's assertio n that there are "no difficu lt
legal question s" presente d by this appeal borders on the
frivolou s.

No federal court, ever, has ordered the creation of

a partners hip in a Title VII case.

Whether Congres s has

created the potenti al for such a remedy is a highly debatab le
.
l/ an d th e cour t b e 1 ow ac k now 1 e d ge d th a t 1' t was a
ques t iondifficu lt issue of first impressi on.

This Court should not

undermin e its ability to resolve that question by allowing the
trial court's order to create the relation ship before the
appeal can be conside red.

ii

~ . ~ . N o t e , Tenure and Partners hip as Title VII
Remedie s, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1980) (discuss ing the debate
over whether tenure and partners hip should be awarded as
remedie s); Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 87
(1984) (discuss ing the potentia l problems of judicial ly imposed
discrim ination remedies like hiring and reinstate ment because
of "[t]he existenc e of highly persona l, voluntar y relation ships
within a business associa tion"); Davila, The
Underre presenta tion of Hispanic Attorney s in Corpora te Law
Firms, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1403, 1427-28 (1987) (discuss ing the
controv ersy surround ing judicial relief in employm ent
discrim ination cases involvin g upper level position s and
judicia l reluctan ce to force an undesira ble relation ship
requirin g close persona l contact, exercise of professi onal
judgmen t and volunta ry associay ion).

-
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Appell ee's argume nts do not overcom e the importa nce of
preserv ing the status quo until this appeal can be consid ered
on the merits .
l.

Probab ility of Succes s on the Merits .

Appell ee

inexpl icably assert s that appeal of the Distri ct Court' s
extrao rdinary , unprec edented and unwarr anted order requiri ng
appell ee's admiss ion to the Price Waterh ouse partne rship
"prese nts no legal questio n that can be describ ed as seriou s,
much less diffic ult," and that "prior decisio ns" either
"settle [] or clearly embrac e[]" the issue.

Opp., at 2-3.

Appell ee does not and cannot cite any author ity for such
pronou ncemen ts.

Indeed , appelle e princi pally relies upon

Hishon v. King & Spaldin g, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), but the
plaint iff in Hishon did not seek admiss ion as a partne r.
Theref ore, the issue whethe r that remedy is statuto rily or
consti tution ally author ized was not before the Court in
Hishon . 2 /
Moreov er, althoug h appelle e conced es that "the
Court' s opinio n in Hishon 'does not require that the
relatio nship among partne rs be charac terized as an employ ment
relatio nship to which Title VII would apply, '" Opp., at 5 n.3
(quotin g Hishon , 467 U.S. at 79 (Powel l, J., concur ring)
(empha sis added by appell ee)), she does not even attemp t to

2/

.s.e.e_ 467 U.S. at 72 (plain tiff "sough t . . . compen satory
damage s 'in lieu of reinsta tement and promot ion to
partne rship.' This, of course , negate s any claim for speciic
perform ance of the contra ct allege d."); id. at 72-73 n.2; id.
at 80 n.4 (Powel l, J., concur ring).

-
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addres s or explain how a statute that does not afford judici al
author ity to regula te partne r relatio nships can possib ly be
interp reted to permit a judici al decree compel ling the creatio n
and contin uation of a volunt ary profes sional associ ation.
Simila rly, contra ry to appell ee's asserti on, Opp.,
at 6-7, the 1987 decisio n of this Court in this case, see
Hopkin s v. Price Waterh ouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73 (D.C. Cir.
1987), did not even remote ly imply, let alone "unmis takably
signal that this Court has no doubt" that partne rship admiss ion
is an author ized Title VII remedy or an approp riate remedy
under the facts of this case.
regard is most mislea ding.

Appell ee's asserti on in that

The issue of partne rship admiss ion

was not tried, briefed , or argued in the Distri ct Court in
1985, and was not a questio n presen ted for review in this Court
or in the Suprem e Court.

Thus, this Court has not had the

opport unity to delibe rate and consid er the merits of the
indisp utably import ant questio n whethe r Title VII's equal
employ ment provis ions empowe r courts to create nonemp loymen t
relatio nships such as partne rships , and, indeed , that questio n
has not been resolve d by any other federa l court.
Other cases relied upon by appelle e, Opp., at 5-6, are
simply inappo site.

Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. 1989),

involve d the reinsta tement of a federa l civil service employ ee
to "essen tially the same job" as he had previo usly held (id. at
158), a remedy that falls square ly within the jurisd iction al
strictu res of Title VII.

Brown v. Truste es of Boston

-
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Un ive rsi ty, 891 F.2 d 337
(1 st Ci r. 19 90 ), ce rt. de
nie d, 58
U. S.L .W . 379 6 (Ju ne 19 ,
19 90 ), aff irm ed an ord er
co mp ell ing
pro mo tio n of an "a ss ist an
t pr of es so r" to "a sso cia
te pr of es so r"
wi th ten ur e.
Su ch an ord er cre ate s no
mo re tha n a lon g-t erm
em plo ym ent re lat io ns hi p.
Mo reo ve r, "[c ]o ur ts ha ve
qu ite rar ely
aw ard ed ten ur e as a rem
edy fo r un law ful di sc rim
in ati on . • • I "
Bro wn , 891 F.2 d at 35 9,
and ha ve ex erc ise d gr ea
t ca uti on in
do ing so . Th us, the co
ur t in Bro wn em ph asi zed
th at the
pl ai nt iff in th at ca se
had rec eiv ed "n ea r un ani
mo us en do rse me nt
by co lle ag ue s . . . [w hic
h] su gg es t[s ] str on gly
th at the re are
no iss ue s Q.f co lle gi ali
ty or the lik e wh ich mi
gh t ma ke the
gr an tin g of ten ur e ina pp
ro pr iat e." Id. at 361 (em
ph asi s
ad de d).
Bro wn is the ref or e bo th
leg all y and fa ctu all y
dis tin gu ish ab le fro m th
is ca se -- ap pe lle e ha s
be en fou nd to
ha ve had "c on sid era ble
pro ble ms de ali ng wi th sta
ff and pe ers "
at Pr ice Wa ter ho use .
618 F. Su pp . 11 14 , 112 0
(D .D .C. 19 85 ) .
Ot he r leg al iss ue s pre sen
ted by th is ap pe al are
sim ila rly di ffi cu lt and
un res olv ed . Fo r ex am ple
, the Di str ict
Co urt de ter mi ne d th at it
wa s bo un d by the law of
the ca se
do ctr ine to a co nc lus ion
ex pre sse d in the pre vio us
Co urt of
Ap pe als ' de cis ion wi th
res pe ct to wh eth er ap pe
lle e had bee n
co ns tru cti ve ly dis ch arg ed
.
Bu t th at rem ed ial de cis ion
wa s
bo un d up in a lia bi lit y
de ter mi na tio n th at wa s
ov ert urn ed by
the Su pre me Co urt and se
t ou t in an op ini on by a
pa ne l of th is
Co urt th at wa s va ca ted
wh en th is ca se wa s rem and
ed to the
Di str ict Co urt . An d it
wa s sq ua rel y and un av oid
ab ly tie d to

-
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the panel' s erroneo us reading of the Distri ct Court' s factua l
finding s.

The Distri ct Court has now made it clear that while

the initia l decisio n to defer appell ee's partne rship candida cy
may have been tainted with discrim ination , the subseq uent
decisio n not to repropo se her for partne r, which made it
imposs ible for her to become a partne r and which was the basis
of her decisio n to leave the firm, was the conseq uence of an
unreas onable and intenti onal act by appelle e and was not
tainted in any way by discrim ination .

Under these

circum stances , the constr uctive discha rge holdin g, which is
centra l to the partne rship decree , is not the law of the case
and cannot be affirme d on appeal .~/
2•

Irrepa rable Injury .

Appell ee's argume nts on the

irrepa rable injury issue are withou t merit.

She asserts that

Price Waterh ouse "[p]ar tners come and go consta ntly withou t
judici al interve ntion," Opp., at 2, and "this occurs withou t
trauma or seriou s injury to the ongoing firm."

Opp., at 8.

Howeve r, partne rs selecte d in the rigorou s Price Waterh ouse

~/ Appell ee's conclu sory statem ent that the Distri ct Court's
imposi tion of Title VII liabil ity under the amorph ous and
ill-def ined sex stereot yping theory is "unass ailable " under the
"clear ly erroneo us standa rd" (Opp., at 5) implie s that it is
imposs ible to meet that standa rd on appeal from a distric t
court' s Title VII judgme nt. This Court, howeve r, has not
hesita ted to overtu rn distri ct court ruling s, where, as here, a
distri ct court has seriou sly misint erprete d the record.
Compar e Palmer v. Baker, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1458,
1461 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 1990) (revers ing distri ct court's
ruling that defend ant had not violate d Title VII because
"distr ict court' s conclu sion
. was based on a clearly
erroneo us interp retatio n" of th~ eviden ce).

-
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partners hip selectio n process (618 F. Supp. at 1111-12) are not
fungible .

The issue is whether appellan t will be irrepara bly

injured by the forced, and, Price Waterho use submits,
erroneo us, admissio n into the partners hip of a candida te whose
own "unreaso nable, intentio nal conduct" (Motion, App. A, at 23)
made it impossi ble for her to become a partner.

In the absence

of a stay, the partners of Price Waterho use will have lost a
substan tial measure of the power to control admissio n to their
partners hip, to "place a high premium on candida tes' ability to
deal with subordin ates and peers on an interper sonal basis"
(618 F. Supp. at 1116), and to "come down hard on abrasive
conduct in men or women seeking partners hip."

Id. at 1120.

Even if Price Waterho use prevails on appeal, the loss of those
rights "unques tionably constitu tes irrepara ble injury."

Elrod

v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plural ity opinion) (the
loss of associa tional freedoms "for even minimal periods of
time, unquest ionably constitu tes irrepara ble injury") .
And every action by appellee as a Price Waterho use
partner will reflect in some measure on its partners and the
partners hip.

Because an organiz ation is large and because each

of its partners might not know every other partner does not
mean that it is less of a professi onal associat ion with high
standard s for partners hip admissio n and consiste nt principl es
for the selectio n of partners and relation ships between
partner s, staff and clients.

Any conduct by appellee towards

subordi nates or involvin g the work of the firm will be that of

-
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a Price Waterho use partner and will have a truly unchang eable
and irrepara ble effect.
On the other hand, appelle e's claims that she will be
irrepara bly injured if a stay is granted are wholly unfound ed.
She asserts that she has "lost seven irreplac eable years of
partner ship," Opp., at 9, but as the Distric t Court's decision
makes clear, appellee wholly "failed to make a reasonab le
effort to find" a position compara ble to a Price Waterho use
partners hip, although "there were numerou s opportu nities open
to her" for compara ble position s.

Motion, App. A, at 26-27.

Appelle e's suggesti on that she sought and obtained the "best
possible alternat ive employm ent," Opp. at 10, is flatly
contrad icted by the Distric t Court's holding that appellee
failed to mitigate .

Having utterly failed even to seek a

partners hip elsewhe re in a compara ble firm, appellee cannot now
contend that she will be substan tially or irrepara bly harmed if
she remains in her "absolu tely superb" (1990 Tr. at 25)
position at the World Bank during the pendency of appeal.
3•

Public Interes t.

Appelle e's assertio ns that an

order maintain ing the status ™ would be contrary to the
"public interest " because the Distric t Court's decision has
been "widely reported " in the media and because a stay might
somehow be "disturb ing" (Opp., at 11) to the public are
fancifu l.

As appellan t explaine d in its Motion, at 17-18, the

fact that importan t and substan tial public policy question s are
involved in this case strongly supports a stay.
t

-
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If the status

.9JJ.Q

is maint ained while this Court consid ers the legal

questi ons presen ted by this appea l, the Title VII policy of
eradic ating discri minat ion will not be harme d.

Indeed , a

reason ed decisi on by this Court can only serve to clarif y the
standa rds that govern employ ment relati onshi ps in the
partne rship settin g.

Appel lee wants an interi m partne rship,

but that relief will surely not serve the public intere st if
it
is ultim ately determ ined that she is not entitl ed to it.

And

it is surely not in the public intere st to underm ine the
abilit y of a Title VII defend ant to receiv e a full and compl
ete
judic ial review of its legiti mate, legal defen ses.
4.

Autom atic Stay of the Money Judgm ent.

Appel lee

conced ed in the Distr ict Court that appel lant is entitl ed to
an
autom atic stay of the back pay portio n of the judgm ent upon
the
postin g of a bond.

Pl. Opp. to Mot. for Stay, at 1.

Her

attem pt to escape the plain meanin g of Rule 62(d) of the
Feder al Rules of Civil Proce dure by labeli ng the $371,1 75 back
pay award "equi table" relief rather than "legal " damag es canno
t
chang e the chara cter of the back pay award, which is
indisp utably a "money judgm ent."

S e e , ~ , Light foot v.

Walke r, 797 F.2d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 1986) (equit able order
award ing attorn ey's fees in federa l discri minat ion case
const itutes money judgm ent and postin g of bond "enti tles the
appel lant to a stay of the judgm ent").

"Beyon d questi on, Rule

62(d) entitl es the appel lant who files a satisf actor y
supers edeas bond to a stay of [a] money judgm ent l l
\

-
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~

matte r of

right."

Federa l Prescr iption Servic e v. Americ an

Pharma ceutica l Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
.
.
. .
4/
( emp h asis
in
or1g1n
a 1) .-

CONCLUSION

Appell ee's own intenti onal conduc t made it imposs ible
for her to become a Price Waterh ouse partne r.

When she left

the firm she made no reason able effort to mitiga te her
damage s.

She is not entitle d to an interim Price Waterh ouse

partne rship while import ant, diffic ult and unreso lved legal
issues are still before the courts .

Dated:

June 28, 1990

Of Counse l:

Respec tfully submit ted,

~~

(D.C. Bar No. 367456 )
Theodo re J. Boutro us, Jr.
(D.C. Bar No. 420440 )
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
1050 Connec ticut Ave., N.
Suite 900
Washin gton, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-850 0

Eldon Olson
Genera l Counse l
Ulric R. Sulliva n
Assist ant Genera l Counse l
PRICE WATERHOUSE
1251 Avenue of the Americ as
New York, New York 10020
(212) 489-890 0

w.

~/ Rule 62(d) has been interpr eted to entitle an appella nt to
a stay as a matter of right even where an equita ble order does
not include a money judgme nt compon ent. £e.§. Becker v. United
States , 451 U.S. 1306, 1309 (Rehnq uist, Circui t Justice )
(taxpay er appeal ing order compel ling it to turn over materi als
in respon se to tax summon s entitle d to automa tic stay upon
posting bond).
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CERTIF ICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoi ng
Reply to Opposi tion to Emerge ncy Motion for Stay to be served
by hand delive ry this 28th day of June 1990, upon James H.
Heller , Esq., Kator, Scott & Heller , 1275 K Street , N.W., Suite
950, Washin gton, D.C.

20006.
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